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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case involves an appeal from a judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union. The District
Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2012) because the claims arose under the laws of the United
States, namely the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear appeals
from any final decision of the United States District Court for the
District of New Union. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). The notice of appeal was filed in a timely manner. Fed. R. App. 4(a).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Is the ESA’s taking provision a valid exercise of Congress’s
Commerce power, as applied to the Karner Blue Butterfly
found on the Cordelia Lot?

II.

Is Cordelia Lear’s takings claim ripe, despite failing to apply for an Incidental Taking Permit?

III.

Is the relevant parcel in this takings analysis the entirety
of Lear Island or the subdivided Cordelia Lot?

IV.

Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, is
Cordelia Lear entitled to compensation for a total taking
when the property retains future economic value?

V.

Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, does
the $1,000 offer for wildlife viewings preclude a total taking
claim for complete loss of economic value?

VI.

Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, do
public trust principles inherent in title preclude a takings
claim based on the denial of the county wetlands permit?

VII.

Assuming the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot,
should the Fish and Wildlife Service and Brittain County
be jointly liable for a total taking, even though their respective regulations only restrict portions of the property?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of New Union. Specifically, this case involves the application of the ESA and a municipal wetlands law to the property
owned by Cordelia Lear (“Plaintiff”). The Plaintiff wants to build a
single-family residence on the property. However, this property is
inhabited by the Karner Blue Butterfly, an endangered species. As
required by the ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) directed the Plaintiff to apply for an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”)
in order to build on the area of the property inhabited by the butterfly. Instead of applying for an ITP, the Plaintiff created an alternative development plan (“ADP”) in which she would build on
another portion of her property containing wetlands. However,
Brittain County denied the Plaintiff’s permit to build on the wetlands because the proposed residence did not meet the County’s
“water-dependent use” requirements.
The Plaintiff filed this suit against the FWS and Brittain
County. The Plaintiff waived any damages in excess of $10,000 in
her takings claim against the United States, allowing her to proceed with her claim in the United States District Court for the District of New Union. In her lawsuit, the Plaintiff sought a declaration that the ESA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional
legislative power. Alternatively, the Plaintiff claimed that both the
FWS and Brittain County took her property without just compensation, thereby violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Plaintiff only brought a total takings
claim and did not advance a claim for a partial or temporary taking. The parties endured a seven-day bench trial before the United
States District Court for the District of New Union.
The Court determined that the ESA is a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the
Court awarded the Plaintiff damages of $10,000 against the FWS
and $90,000 against Brittain County for an unconstitutional taking of the Plaintiff’s property. All three parties appealed and now
seek review from this Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case center on two separate regulations placed
on the Plaintiff’s property and how these regulations impact her
property rights.
Lear Island History. Lear Island is a 1,000-acre island located in Brittain County, New Union. R. at 4. Lear Island sits
within Lake Union, a large interstate lake traditionally used for
interstate navigation. Id. In 1803, Congress granted Cornelius
Lear title in fee simple absolute to all of Lear Island, including
lands underwater within 300 feet of the shoreline. R. at 4-5. In the
early twentieth century, the Lear family built one causeway that
connects Lear Island to the mainland of Brittain County. R. at 5.
Cornelius Lear and his descendants have occupied the entire island since 1803, primarily using the land as a homestead. Id.
In 1965, King James Lear, owning the entirety of Lear Island,
sought to divide the island into three parcels, one for each of his
three daughters. Id. King Lear created the 550-acre Goneril Lot,
440-acre Regan Lot, and 10-acre Cordelia Lot. Id. King Lear then
deeded the respective lots to his daughters, while reserving a life
estate in each lot for himself. Id.
The Plaintiff came into possession of the Cordelia Lot in 2005,
upon the death of her father, King Lear. Id. The Cordelia Lot is
only accessible through the main portion of Lear Island. Id. The
10-acre Cordelia Lot consists of an access strip, a nine-acre open
field covered in lupine flowers, and one acre of wetlands. Id. The
wetlands are in a cove, accessible to open water, and were traditionally used as a boat landing. Id. The Lear family has kept the
nine-acre lupine field, also known as the “Heath,” open by annual
mowing. Id. The Heath is inhabited by the Karner Blue Butterfly,
an endangered species. R. at 6.
Karner Blue Butterfly Protection. The Karner Blue Butterfly obtained the protection of the ESA in 1992. Id. Although Karner
Blue Butterflies are found in other states, the last remaining population in New Union lives on the Heath of the Cordelia Lot. Id.
This subpopulation on the Heath is entirely intrastate and does
not cross any State boundaries. Id. Accordingly, in 1992, the FWS
designated the Heath as a critical habitat for the New Union subpopulation of Karner Blue Butterfly. Id.
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FWS Permit Recommendation. In April 2012, the Plaintiff
contacted the FWS to inquire whether she would need any permits
to build a single-family residence on the Heath of the Cordelia Lot.
R. at 4, 6. The FWS advised the Plaintiff that any disturbance of
the Heath, other than continued annual mowing, would constitute
a “take” of an endangered species. R. at 6. However, the FWS informed the Plaintiff that it was possible to obtain an ITP under
section 10 of the ESA. Id.
The FWS field agent advised the Plaintiff to include in her application a habitat conservation plan (“HCP”) for the Karner Blue
Butterfly. Id. The field agent also informed the Plaintiff that an
approvable HCP would provide for additional contiguous lupine
habitat on an acre-for-acre basis and a commitment to continue
annual mowing of the remaining lupine fields. Id. Without the annual mowing, the natural ecological process would eliminate the
Karner Blue Butterfly’s habitat in approximately ten years. R. at
7.
Wetlands Protection. The Plaintiff elected not to pursue an
ITP, and instead proposed an ADP that would not disturb the lupine fields. Id. The Plaintiff proposed filling one-half acre of the
wetlands to create a building site, along with a connecting causeway to provide access to the shared mainland causeway. Id. Brittain County denied the wetlands fill permit, however, because the
1982 Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law only allows wetlands to be filled for water-dependent uses. Id.
The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot is $100,000. Id. The
Lot requires $1,500 in annual property taxes. Id. However, the
Plaintiff has not sought a reassessment of the value of the Cordelia
Lot since the denial of the permit under the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law. Id. Moreover, the Plaintiff rejected an offer from the Brittain County Butterfly Society of $1,000 per year
for the right to conduct butterfly viewing outings during the summer. Id.
The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the FWS and Brittain
County. Id. The Plaintiff claimed that the ESA is unconstitutional,
and, in the alternative, brought a takings claim against both the
FWS and Brittain County. Id. The District Court held that the ESA
is a valid exercise of Congressional power and awarded damages
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against the FWS and Brittain County for an unconstitutional taking. All three parties appealed and now seek review from this
Court. R. at 4.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate three categories of activities among the States. Specific to
this case is Congress’s power to regulate activities that “substantially affect interstate commerce.” Thus far, the Supreme Court
has held that only activities which are “economic in nature” substantially affect interstate commerce. Because the ESA specifically
prohibits the taking of endangered species, this Court must evaluate whether the taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly “substantially
affects” interstate commerce. As this butterfly is neither economic
nor commercial, there is no substantial effect on the commerce of
the United States. Additionally, the ESA is a statute focused primarily on conservation and not economic activity. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to regulate this intrastate butterfly
on the Plaintiff’s property.
For a regulatory taking, a taking is not ripe until the regulating government agency issues a final decision. The ESA prohibits
the taking of certain species, but will grant an ITP with an acceptable application. The approval or denial of an ITP is typically viewed
as the final decision for ESA takings. Here, the Plaintiff did not
apply for an ITP before she brought her takings claim. Further, the
District Court erred in finding that: the FWS declared a policy
denying the Plaintiff a permit; the permit would exceed the fair
market value of the property; and the permit process is overly burdensome. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s takings claim is unripe and
should be barred.
In a takings analysis, courts are instructed to view the “parcel
as a whole” to determine whether a taking warrants compensation.
In applying the “parcel as a whole” rule, the court should focus on
the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” of the claimant
and whether a given property is treated as a “single economic unit.”
Courts should also balance “fairness and justice” to ensure that
both the rights of property owners and governmental interests are
protected. Here, the Plaintiff has no reasonable investment-backed
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expectations in the Cordelia Lot because she had notice of the regulatory restrictions on the Lot when she received ownership of the
property. Equally important, the Lear family has treated Lear Island as a single parcel for over 200 years. Thus, fairness and justice
support viewing the entirety of Lear Island as the relevant parcel,
and not solely the subdivided Cordelia Lot.
Even if this Court finds that the Cordelia Lot is the relevant
parcel, a total taking has not occurred. To qualify as a total taking,
the property must have 100% of its economic value physically
taken or restricted. The regulations on the Cordelia Lot are at most
a moratorium because the Plaintiff will have full use of the entire
property in the near future. The Supreme Court has held that moratoriums are temporary takings and not total takings. Therefore,
the Plaintiff’s total takings claim fails.
Similarly, the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay
$1,000 per year for wildlife viewing precludes a total takings claim.
Total takings law is replete with “all-or-nothing” scenarios where
a plaintiff lost nearly all the beneficial use of his or her land, and
yet was not due compensation. Moreover, the $1,500 property tax
does not negate the value of the Butterfly Society’s offer. It is not
the government’s responsibility to ensure the marketability and
profitability of a citizen’s land. The offer is evidence that economically beneficial uses still exist. Further, courts have held that monetary benefits are not the only definition of “beneficial use.” Accordingly, the present economic value of the property precludes the
Plaintiff’s total takings claim.
Even if the relevant parcel is solely the Cordelia Lot, public
trust principles inherent in title preclude the Plaintiff’s claim
against Brittain County. The cove of the Lot provides access to
Lake Union, which as a “navigable-in-fact-waterway,” makes it
part of the public trust. The District Court improperly held that
Lake Union could not be included in the public trust in 1803. Further, the Supreme Court has held that the conveyance of title by
Congress to the soil beneath a navigable waterway becomes void
upon the admittance of a state into the Union, and is thereafter
regulated according to state law. Therefore, the grant of the underwater lands to the Lears in 1803 became void when New Union
became a state. Additionally, the Plaintiff’s claim is precluded because filling public trust wetlands equates to a nuisance arising
from the background principles of state law.
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Finally, the ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law must be considered separately. In a novel question, the
District Court applied what it incorrectly called the “prevailing”
tort rule of joint liability to a takings case. However, most states
apply either several liability or modified joint and several liability.
Further, the damages here are easily divisible. Even if the Court
finds a total taking, the County should only be liable for, at most,
ten percent of the value of the property based upon the one acre
restricted by the County wetlands law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See
Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). Here, the facts
upon which the District Court rendered its judgment are not in
dispute. Rather, the County argues that the District Court misapplied the law in finding a total taking. Therefore, this Court should
review the District Court’s order de novo.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF
CONGRESS’S COMMERCE POWER BECAUSE
THE TAKING OF THE BRITTAIN COUNTY
SUBPOPULATION OF KARNER BLUE
BUTTERFLY DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
AFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The Commerce Clause provides Congress with the limited
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. ART.
I, § 8, CL. 3. In interpreting the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court recognizes three categories of activity among the States that
Congress may regulate: (1) the channels of interstate commerce;
(2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities
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that substantially affect interstate commerce.1 See United States
v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549, 558-59; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 608-09. Thus far, the Supreme Court has held that only activities that are “economic in nature” qualify as “substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
For example, in Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Gun
Free School Zones Act, which prohibited the possession of firearms
within 1,000 feet of a school zone, did not regulate an economic
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce and therefore
was unconstitutional. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. Similarly, in Morrison, the Supreme Court held that the Violence Against Women
Act, which provided a federal civil remedy for victims of genderbased violence, did not regulate economic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce, and therefore was an unlawful exercise of the Commerce Power. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
Here, the FWS asks this Court to find that the taking of the
Karner Blue Butterfly on the Cordelia Lot is an economic activity
that affects interstate commerce. Based on an examination of the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, the
FWS and District Court’s claims are in error. The regulated activity is the taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly, which is categorically
a noneconomic activity. The Plaintiff taking this butterfly has little
to no effect on interstate commerce. Additionally, the ESA is fundamentally a conservation statute, leaving Congress without constitutional authority to regulate this wholly intrastate butterfly.
A. The Regulated and Relevant Activity Is the Taking
of the Karner Blue Butterfly and Not the Proposed
Construction of a Private Residence.
Before determining whether an activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, the activity at issue must be identified. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. To do so, courts are instructed to examine
the activity “expressly regulated” by Congress. GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, the
District Court improperly determined that “the relevant activity is
1. It is undisputed that the ESA’s taking provision is not regulating a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce. Therefore, it must survive judicial
scrutiny under the “substantial effects” analysis as described in Lopez and Morrison.
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the underlying land development through construction of the proposed residence.” R. at 8. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323
F.3d 1062, 1069.
Other courts have entirely rejected this inference-based interpretation of “regulated activity.” As the Fifth Circuit noted, “Congress, through [the] ESA, is not directly regulating commercial development.” GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 634. The ESA specifically
states: “[W]ith respect to any endangered species . . . it is unlawful
for any person . . . to . . . take any such species within the United
States.” 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Therefore, the plain language of
the ESA requires this Court to determine whether taking an endangered species, i.e., the Karner Blue Butterfly, “substantially affects” interstate commerce.
Even if this Court finds that the regulated and relevant activity is the underlying land development, building one private residence on private property does not “substantially affect interstate
commerce.” See, e.g., Jones v. U.S., 529 U.S. 848, 854-55 (2000). In
Jones, the Supreme Court held that the proper inquiry is “the function of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that
function affects interstate commerce.” Id.
There is no evidence to support the District Court’s claim that
purchasing building materials or hiring contractors would require
any interstate activities. R. at 8. Additionally, this Court must look
at the function of the proposed single family residence. Jones, 529
U.S. at 854-55. One residential home on an island does not affect
interstate commerce. To accept the opposite view would “effectually obliterate” the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause, as
“[t]here would be no limit to Congress’ authority to regulate intrastate activities.” GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 634. Therefore, this
Court should follow the plain language of the ESA and reverse the
District Court’s finding.
B. The Taking of a Noneconomic, Intrastate Butterfly
Does Not Satisfy the Lopez and Morrison Test for
Substantially Affecting Interstate Commerce.
After establishing that the regulated and relevant activity is
the taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly, the Court must then determine whether the activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce. To do so, the Court must evaluate whether the: (1) regulation relates to an economic activity; (2) statute contains an “express
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jurisdictional element” which might limit the regulation’s reach;
(3) legislative history contains “express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce;” and (4) connection
between the regulated activity and substantial effect on interstate
commerce is “attenuated.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12. This balance is required to show “whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate
commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. Here, the District Court erred
by relying upon factually and legally distinguishable decisions
from other circuits, and failed to balance the four factors articulated in Morrison.
1.

The Regulation Does Not Relate to an
Economic Activity Because the Plaintiff’s
Taking of the Karner Blue Butterfly Is Not an
Economic Activity.

The first factor a court must assess under Lopez and Morrison
is whether the regulated activity includes an “economic endeavor.”
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611. The Supreme Court has upheld “congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where [the
Court] concluded that the activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60. Acts previously upheld include: regulations involving coal mining, credit transactions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, and inns and hotels catering to interstate guests. Id.
Logic, however, cannot support finding that the taking of the
Brittain County Karner Blue Butterfly is similar to any of the
aforementioned economic activities. Yet, the FWS asks this Court
to find that a mere butterfly, possibly never seen by any resident
of New Union besides a member of the Lear family, is somehow an
economic activity affecting the commerce of the United States. As
the late Justice Scalia stated, “[A]lthough Congress’s authority to
regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce is broad, it does not permit the Court to ‘pile inference
upon inference’ . . . to establish that noneconomic activity has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 31 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Karner Blue Butterfly in Brittain County has little commercial or economic value, and
is found on just nine acres of private land. Hence, the taking of this
butterfly is categorically noneconomic.
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No Jurisdictional Element Exists to Ensure
that Regulated ESA Takings Have a
Substantial Affect on Interstate Commerce.

The next factor this Court must consider is whether the ESA’s
takings provision contains an “express jurisdictional element
which might limit [the regulation’s] reach to . . . an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at
611-12. In other words, courts look to whether there is language in
the statute limiting regulation only to activities that affect interstate commerce. Id. This jurisdictional element is necessary to help
“establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 612.
The ESA’s statutory language makes it illegal for “any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . take any [endangered] species within the United States.” 16 U.S.C.
§1538(a)(1)(B). Plainly absent in the statute is any specific language stating that the endangered species must affect interstate
commerce. Id. Therefore, the ESA’s takings provision is missing a
jurisdictional element with an “explicit connection” to interstate
commerce.
3.

The Intrastate Regulation of Taking the
Brittain County Karner Blue Butterfly Is Not
Supported by Legislative History.

The third factor is whether the ESA or the statute’s legislative
history contain “express congressional findings” to support regulating the activity’s effects upon interstate commerce. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 612. Such findings help courts “evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce, even though no substantial effect is visible to the
naked eye.” Id.
The ESA’s plain language makes no reference to the effects of
endangered species on the economy or interstate commerce. See 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531 (“The Congress finds and declares that . . . these
species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation
and its people.”). Notably absent from this language is any use of
the words “economic” or “commercial.” Id. This is because the ESA
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is a statute focused on biodiversity and conservation, not the economy or regulation of interstate commerce. As one scholar stated,
“[t]he biodiversity argument comes close to saying that because the
earth is necessary for interstate commerce, anything that adversely affects the earth can be regulated by Congress.” John
Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 177, 199 (1998). However, this
is the exact type of over-regulation that the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional in Lopez and Morrison. See United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 632 (10th Cir. 2006).
Furthermore, the FWS final rule listing the Karner Blue Butterfly as an endangered species contains no express findings that
establish the butterfly’s relationship with interstate commerce.
See 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992). The FWS final rule simply
summarizes the history of the Karner Blue Butterfly, lists certain
characteristics of the animal, and future conservation measures.
Id. Noticeably absent from the rule is any discussion about the economic market or substantial effect this butterfly has on interstate
commerce. Id. As such, both the ESA and the FWS final rule are
silent on any alleged effect this butterfly has on interstate commerce.
4.

The Connection Between Takes of the Karner
Blue Butterfly and Interstate Commerce Is
Attenuated.

The final factor in the balancing test is whether the substantial effect on interstate commerce is “attenuated.” Morrison, 529
U.S. at 612. In Morrison, the Court rejected aggregating the “costs
of crime” and “national productivity” arguments because they
would “permit Congress to ‘regulate not only all violent crime, but
all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.’” Id. (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 564). In doing so, the Court explained that this type of
aggregation would attenuate the claimed substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. Similarly, if the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the power to regulate the Karner Blue Butterfly, future
courts would be “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
Therefore, the FWS and Plaintiff’s argument in support of constitutionality is attenuated.

13
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After properly considering the four factors articulated in Morrison, the balancing test shows that Congress has no power to regulate this taking under the Commerce Clause. The taking is not an
economic activity; there is no jurisdictional element limiting regulation; legislative history does not support the regulation; and the
connection to interstate commerce is attenuated. Therefore, the
District Court’s holding should be reversed.
C. The ESA Is Not a Larger Regulation of Economic
Activity Because the Primary Focus of the Statute
Is Conservation.
Despite the clear answer provided by a proper analysis of
Lopez and Morrison, other circuits have “piled inference upon inference” to find that the ESA is constitutional. See San Luis &
Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne,
477 F.3d 1250, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007). In these cases, both the Salazar and Kempthorne Courts misconstrued the Supreme Court’s
holding in Gonzalez v. Raich. 545 U.S. at 27-28. In Raich, the Supreme Court held that Congress, through the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), could regulate the growth of purely intrastate
medical marijuana because it had a substantial effect on the regulation of the interstate supply, consumption, and market of marijuana. Id.
The ESA, however, is readily distinguishable from the CSA
and Raich’s limited holding, as the ESA is regulating takings that
do not have a larger economic purpose. See PETPO v. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1346 (C.D. Utah 2014).
Rather, the ESA’s primary purpose is on conservation, not supply
or consumption. Id. Applying Raich to the taking of the Utah Prairie Dog, a wholly intrastate species found on private land, the
PETPO Court held that the Commerce Clause “does not authorize
Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that has
no substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. In PETPO, the
Court found that ESA takes “differ[] significantly from Raich in
one important way: takes of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal
land would not substantially affect the national market for any
commodity regulated by the ESA.” Id. Similarly, the taking of the
Karner Blue Butterfly on the Cordelia Lot would not substantially
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affect any national market or have any effect on interstate commerce. Therefore, Raich supports a finding that Congress has no
regulatory authority under the ESA over the Karner Blue Butterfly.
The Tenth Circuit once quipped, “[A]ny use of anything might
have an affect on interstate commerce, in the same sense [that] a
butterfly flapping its wings in China might bring about a change
of weather in New York.” Patton, 451 F.3d at 618. However, it is
the duty of the judiciary to provide the appropriate checks and balances on Congress’s attempts to overstep its constitutionallygranted powers. The Supreme Court has emphatically held that
“the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting
the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619. The balancing test established in Lopez and
Morrison affirms that the role of regulating and protecting the Karner Blue Butterfly should be left to Brittain County, and to the
State of New Union. To hold otherwise would “effectively obliterate
the distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
II. THE PLAINTIFF’S TAKINGS CLAIM IS NOT RIPE
BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO FILE AN APPEAL
FROM A FINAL INCIDENTAL TAKING PERMIT
DECISION.
For a regulatory taking, a claim “is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulation has reached
a final decision.” Morris v. U.S., 392 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (quoting Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 472 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)). In the ESA context, “the final
decision requirement has been held to mean that the takings claim
is not ripe until an ITP has been applied for and, usually, denied.”
ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31796, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND CLAIMS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS “TAKINGS” 6 (2013).
The finality requirement is necessary to show to “a reasonable
degree of certainty what limitations the agency will, pursuant to
the regulations, place on the property.” Morris, 392 F.3d at 1376.
This means that “when an agency provides procedures for obtaining a final decision, a takings claim is unlikely to be ripe until the
property owner complies with those procedures.” Id. Accordingly,
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thus far, “no court has been willing to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to
even apply for an ITP.” MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., at 6 (emphasis in original).
A. The Plaintiff Failed to Follow the ESA Permit
Procedures Because She Never Applied for an ITP.
The ESA prohibits the “take” of certain listed species, but
grants the Secretary the power to permit “incidental takings.” See
16 U.S.C. §§ 1538-1539. To receive an ITP, “a person wishing to
engage in acts that might effect a ‘take’ of a listed species must file
an application [with the FWS] that includes a Habitat Conservation Plan (‘HCP’).” Morris, 392 F.3d at 1374; see also 50 C.F.R.
§ 222.307 (outlining the permit process under the ESA for an incidental taking). This is not an option, but rather is a requirement
under the ESA to ensure the proper procedures are followed. See
16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(1)(B); Morris, 392 F.3d at 1377-78. Filing for
an ITP also allows the FWS an opportunity to work with the property owner to develop an appropriate plan. Morris, 392 F.3d at
1377-78.
Here, the Plaintiff never filed an ITP, therefore rendering her
takings claim premature. The District Court found that the government declared a policy denying the Plaintiff an ITP by requiring a condition that “would be impossible for [the] Plaintiff to satisfy.” R. at 9. The District Court also granted the Plaintiff a “futility
exception” based on the premise that the permit process would exceed the value of her property and would be burdensome. Id. However, both findings by the District Court are in error.
B. The FWS Never Declared a Policy Denying the
Plaintiff a Permit.
The District Court incorrectly found that the FWS “declared a
policy” denying the Plaintiff a permit. The Court claimed that the
FWS recommendation letter constituted a condition that the Plaintiff could not satisfy. Rather, the letter simply advised the Plaintiff
that an acceptable HCP would include replacing disturbed lupine
field with contiguous lupine field. Id. Relying on Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, the District Court held that there was no need for the Plaintiff to apply for an ITP, as this application would be futile.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001).
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While the Supreme Court has held that federal ripeness rules
do not require the submission of “further and futile applications
with other agencies,” the facts of the Palazzolo case are easily distinguished from the present case. In Palazzolo, the plaintiff applied
a total of three times for a permit to build on wetlands with local
county restrictions. Id. at 618-19. After the third application was
denied, the plaintiff instituted a takings claim. Id. The Supreme
Court rejected the county’s argument that the third denial was not
a final decision, and held that any further applications would be
futile. Id. at 626. Here, the District Court is attempting to analogize a recommendation in a letter to the rejection of three applications. However, there are clearly factual and legal differences.
The Supreme Court has held that the permit process is designed to help property owners receive permission to use the property as desired. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985). In Riverside Bayview, the Court
stated:
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a
certain use of his or her property does not itself ‘take’ the property
in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free
to use the property as desired.

Id. Thus, the FWS letter was not a final decision but rather a recommendation to the Plaintiff to pave the way for the approval of
her ITP. The Plaintiff claims that the recommendation “would be
impossible to satisfy” as she is estranged from her sister, thereby
eliminating the “contiguous land” option. R. at 9. However, there
is no evidence that the Plaintiff apprised the FWS of the circumstances, such that an alternative plan could be formulated. Id. The
Plaintiff received the recommendation from the FWS, and decided
unilaterally to pursue an ADP. Had the Plaintiff informed the FWS
of her alleged limitation to the property, a variance may have been
granted or the FWS could have provided an alternative recommendation.
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C. The “Futility Exception” Is Not Applicable
Because the Cost of the Permit Does Not Exceed
Fair Market Value of the Property and Is Not
Inherently Burdensome.
The District Court erred by finding that the permit process
would exceed the fair market value of the property and be overly
burdensome. First, “[t]he cost of an ITP application is unknowable
until the agency has had some meaningful opportunity to exercise
its discretion to assist in the process.” Morris, 392 F.3d at 1377
(emphasis added). In Morris, the plaintiffs contacted the National
Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) to visit and evaluate whether
harvesting protected trees would constitute a taking. Id. at 1374.
The NMFS agent advised the plaintiffs that the action would effect
a taking, and therefore they should apply for an ITP. Id. The plaintiffs obtained an estimate which stated that the cost of the ITP
would exceed the value of the property, and immediately filed a
takings action. Id. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims of a taking, the
Morris Court stated that “the [plaintiffs’] claim cannot ripen until
the agency refuses to exercise its discretion, or exercises its discretion in a manner that makes reasonably clear or final the effect the
regulation will have on the [plaintiff’s] application.” Id. at 1377-78.
Here, the FWS was never given the opportunity to fully exercise its discretion to assist in the process of formulating an ITP. It
is thus unknown what the FWS could have done to reduce any alleged costs of the ITP. Therefore, the “futility exception” does not
apply when the costs of the Plaintiff’s ITP are “unknowable.” Id. at
1377.
Additionally, the process of obtaining an ITP under the ESA is
not “inherently burdensome.” The Habitat Conservation Planning
and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook directs the FWS
to assist the applicant and advise the property owner on “key policy
and substantive issues.”2 If allowed, the FWS is to play an active
role to ensure that the ITP process is as palatable as possible. The
Plaintiff, however, never gave the FWS the opportunity to reduce
or eliminate the claimed burden, as she immediately pursued an
ADP.
2. Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit Processing
Handbook (Nov. 4, 1996), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/laws/hcp_handbook.pdf. See pages 1-15 and 2-3.
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The Plaintiff failed to follow ESA procedures and filed a takings claim prematurely. These procedures would have provided the
FWS with the adequate information it needed to determine what
actions were appropriate concerning the Plaintiff’s property. While
the District Court granted the Plaintiff an exception, “[t]he futility
exception . . . applies only where the agency’s conduct operates as
a constructive denial of a permit, not where the permitting process
is merely complex, arduous, or expensive.” Morris, 392 F.3d at
1375. Therefore, the District Court erred by granting improper exceptions to the general rule of ripeness.
III. THE RELEVANT PARCEL FOR THE TAKINGS
ANALYSIS IS THE ENTIRETY OF LEAR ISLAND
BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO
REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS AND HAS ALWAYS TREATED
LEAR ISLAND AS A SINGLE ECONOMIC UNIT.
The District Court incorrectly determined that the relevant
parcel for this taking is the Cordelia Lot, and not all of Lear Island.
The District Court relied on the “formal subdivision” of Lear Island
into three separate parcels, and treated this fact as dispositive.
However, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected a cookie-cutter approach to determining the relevant parcel. See Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (“[The Court
focuses on] the character of the action and on the nature and extent
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.”). Instead,
courts should evaluate the “entire property interest at stake rather
than individual property interests to determine if a regulatory taking has occurred.” Laura J. Powell, The Parcel as a Whole: Defining
the Relevant Parcel in Temporary Regulatory Takings Cases, 89
WASH. L. REV. 151, 160 (2014).
In applying the “parcel as a whole” rule, courts must focus on
the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” of the claimant
and whether a given property is treated as a “single economic unit.”
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-25. Additional relevant factors include: “(i) the degree of contiguity between property interests; (ii)
the dates of acquisition of property interests; (iii) the extent to
which a parcel has been treated as a single income-producing unit;
and (iv) the extent to which the regulated lands increase the value
of the remaining lands.” Brace v. U.S., 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 348 (2006),
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aff’d 250 Fed. Appx. 359 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1258
(2008). These factors are not decisive by themselves, but are
“weighed together, taking into account all relevant circumstances.”
Powell, The Parcel as a Whole, 89 WASH. L. REV. at 160. However,
the “regulation’s economic impact” often determines whether a regulatory taking has occurred. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (“[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large
part . . . upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact.”)
In order to balance the government’s interests with private
property interests, the Supreme Court relies on overarching principles of “fairness and justice” to guide the ad hoc decision. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24. When appropriately balanced, these
economic and fairness factors demonstrate that there were no reasonable investment-backed expectations for the Cordelia Lot. Additionally, the three subdivided lots on Lear Island have all been
treated as one parcel and a single economic unit. Therefore, the
appropriate denominator for the takings analysis is the entirety of
Lear Island, and not the Cordelia Lot.
A. The Plaintiff Has No Reasonable InvestmentBacked Expectations for the Cordelia Lot Because
She Had Notice of the Regulatory Restrictions and
Made No Financial Investment in the Lot.
For any regulatory takings claim to succeed, “the claimant
must show that the government’s regulatory restraint interfered
with [her] investment-backed expectations in a manner that requires the government to [provide] compensat[ion].” Good v. U.S.,
189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Loveladies Harbor v.
U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). As the Supreme Court
has stated, “[a] landowner cannot demonstrate a taking ‘simply by
showing [it was] denied the ability to exploit a property interest.’”
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. These investment-backed expectations must be “reasonable and based on existing conditions,” and
“not merely a unilateral expectation or an abstract need.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984).
For example, in Good v. United States, the Court denied compensation to a property owner who, after receiving several permits
to fill wetlands on his property, was denied a renewal of a wetlands
fill permit under the Endangered Species Act. Good, 189 F.3d at
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1363. Despite the owner purchasing the property with the intention to develop it, the Court determined that:
the property owner had notice over a nearly twenty-year period of
an existing regulatory scheme that made the proposed project potentially difficult or impossible to complete. [Therefore], the owner
had not demonstrated that he held reasonable investment-backed
expectations.

Id. Similarly, the Plaintiff here cannot claim she had reasonable
investment-backed expectations to build on the Cordelia Lot. The
Plaintiff’s fee simple rights to the Cordelia Lot did not vest until
her father passed away in 2005. At that time, the Brittain County
wetlands regulation had been in place for twenty-three years, and
the Karner Blue Butterfly had been listed under the ESA for thirteen years. As in Good, these regulatory schemes put the Plaintiff
on notice that the right to build on the property would likely be
restricted. Good, 189 F.3d at 1361.
Additionally, the Plaintiff made no economic investment in the
ten-acre parcel. Lear Island was granted by Congress in 1803, and
was inherited by her father, who then subdivided lots to his daughters. With no personal financial stake in the Cordelia Lot, any compensation would amount to a “windfall,” which should be viewed
with special scrutiny. Id.; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635
(“[S]ome property owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
B. The Plaintiff and Her Family Have Always Treated
Lear Island as a Single Economic Unit.
The Supreme Court has held that where legally separate parcels are treated as a single economic unit, “together they may constitute the relevant parcel.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedicts, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). As other courts have aptly
noted, “[T]he United States Supreme Court has never endorsed a
test that segments a contiguous property to determine the relevant
parcel.” Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Wis.
1996). Rather, the Court has consistently held that a property in
such a case “should be considered as a whole.” Id.
For example, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals has previously held that the “parcel as a whole” rule required the Court to
examine an entire thirty-eight lot parcel, and not just the legally
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subdivided parcel that was unbuildable due to a wetlands by-law,
as all of the lots were contiguous and used together. FIC Homes of
Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Commission of Blackstone, 673
N.E.2d 61, 70-71(Mass. App. Ct. 1996). In a similar case, the same
Court held that even though one of eleven legally subdivided lots
could not be developed, there was not a taking because there was
still “economically beneficial use of the original parcel as a whole.”
Zanghi v. Board of Appeals of Bedford, 807 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2004).
It is undisputed that Lear Island has been treated as one parcel for over 200 years. Since 1803, Cornelius Lear and his descendants have occupied the entirety of Lear Island. R. at 5. The family
built one causeway that connects the island to the mainland of
Brittain County. Id. Without this causeway, none of the subdivided
lots would have value, much less access to society. Similarly, the
Cordelia Lot is only accessible through the main portion of Lear
Island. Id. Just like the Courts in FIC Homes and Zanghi, this
Court should not view the subdivision of Lear Island as dispositive.
Instead, the Court should treat the parcel in the same way the
Plaintiff and her family have: as one economic unit with access to
all family members.
C. Justice and Fairness Support Viewing the
Entirety of Lear Island as the Relevant Parcel.
Finally, in making a Fifth Amendment takings determination,
courts must assess whether a claimant’s proffered conception of the
“parcel as a whole” comports with principles of “fairness and justice.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24. The Supreme Court stated:
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.

Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Armstrong supports the
idea of a “balancing test within a balancing test.” Jeffrey M. Gaba,
Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and
the Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 574-75 (2007). In
other words, courts should not only consider the relevant parcel as
a whole, but also balance “fairness and justice” throughout the
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analysis. Id. The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of
achieving “fairness and justice” in both Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (discussing the balancing role
of “fairness and justice”); see also Tahoe Sierra, 535 U.S. at 336
(discussing whether “fairness and justice” would support categorical takings rules).
The District Court’s determination that the Cordelia Lot is the
relevant parcel for this taking clearly violates the concepts of “fairness and justice.” The Lear family has enjoyed the benefits of owning Lear Island for more than 200 years. Moreover, the Island
given to the family by Congress is worth approximately
$10,000,000.3 R. at 4. The regulations placed on 1% of the property
serve societal interests in both protecting Endangered Species and
preserving the County’s wetlands. While it is unfortunate that the
Karner Blue Butterfly populates the location in which the Plaintiff
would like to build a house, this fact does not support treating the
Lot as the denominator in a takings analysis. Based on the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence, the relevant parcel is clearly
Lear Island. Any other interpretation would be “unfair” and “unjust.”
IV. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY
THE CORDELIA LOT, THE PLAINTIFF’S TOTAL
TAKINGS CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THE LOT
RETAINS FUTURE ECONOMIC VALUE.
Even if this Court finds that the Cordelia Lot is the relevant
parcel, a total taking has not occurred because the lot will be developable in the future, thereby retaining economic value. In a takings case, there are two types of analysis: (1) a total taking under
Lucas; and (2) a temporary or partial taking under Penn Central.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). According to the Plaintiff and
the District Court, since the Plaintiff cannot build a home on her
property today, she deserves to be compensated for the lost value
of her entire property. However, this approach was unequivocally
rejected by the Supreme Court. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341.
3. The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot is $100,000. R. at 5. Therefore,
the entirety of Lear Island is worth approximately $10,000,000 based on a $10,000
per acre calculation.
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In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court held that a 36-month building moratorium was not a total taking because it did not deny the property
owner of all economic value. Id. at 339. The Court stated that this
type of moratorium was, at most, a temporary taking and not a
total taking. Id. The Court reaffirmed that any taking that results
in less than a 100% loss of economic value would not meet the requirements under Lucas. Id. at 330. Instead, these temporary takings claims should be brought and analyzed under the Penn Central balancing test. Id. (“Anything less than a ‘complete elimination
of value,’ or a ‘total loss’ . . . would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central.”). Since the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra failed
to argue that a temporary taking has occurred, the Supreme Court
refused to apply a Penn Central balancing test. Id. Instead, the
Court held that, under Lucas, the plaintiffs did not suffer a taking
as they did not lose 100% of the economic value because they could
use the property in the future. Id. at 341.
A. The Building Moratorium Does Not Deprive the
Plaintiff of All Economic Value Because the
Cordelia Lot Is Developable in the Future.
The District Court attempted to rationalize a total taking by
noting that the moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra was shorter than the
proposed moratorium for the Plaintiff. Admittedly, the District
Court is correct in finding that the moratorium would likely last
longer than the 36 months in Tahoe-Sierra. However, the Supreme
Court has refused to formulate a rule that moratoriums lasting
longer than a certain amount of time would count as total takings.
Id. at 321. Instead, the Court held that a property “cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is
lifted.” Id. at 332.
Applying the holding in Tahoe-Sierra, the building moratorium on the Cordelia Lot clearly does not deprive the Plaintiff of
all economic value. The Plaintiff has the ability to use and develop
the Cordelia Lot in the future, once the moratorium is naturally
lifted through the ecological process. Thus, the Plaintiff’s total takings claim brought under Lucas fails to meet the requirement for
total loss of all economic value.
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B. The Plaintiff Failed to Bring a Temporary Taking
Claim Under Penn Central.
In rejecting the total takings claim under Lucas, the TahoeSierra Court noted that its holding did not preclude an analysis of
a temporary taking under Penn Central. Id. at 317-18. However,
the Tahoe-Sierra Court did not apply the Penn Central balancing
test because the plaintiffs failed to bring a temporary takings
claim. Id. Similarly, the Plaintiff in this case failed to bring a temporary or partial takings claim under Penn Central. R. at 8 (“Plaintiff does not advance a claim for a partial regulatory taking based
on Penn Central.”). Therefore, this Court should only analyze the
taking under the Lucas rule.
Even if this Court undertakes a Penn Central analysis sua
sponte, despite the Plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue, a temporary
takings claim would fail. As discussed above, the Plaintiff cannot
establish the necessary “reasonable investment-backed expectations” that is the crux of a temporary taking. Lingle, 544 U.S. at
540. Since the Plaintiff is not claiming a partial or temporary taking, this Court should heed the Supreme Court’s advisement in Tahoe-Sierra and not find a temporary taking where one has not been
properly alleged. Hence, the Plaintiff’s total takings claim against
Brittain County and the FWS fails.
V. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY
THE CORDELIA LOT, THERE IS NOT A TOTAL
TAKINGS BECAUSE THE CORDELIA LOT HAS
CURRENT ECONOMIC VALUE.
Even if the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 per year for
wildlife viewing precludes a takings claim for complete loss of economic value. The Plaintiff was not deprived of all beneficial use of
her land, even if she cannot develop the land in the manner that
she had hoped.
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A. The Plaintiff is Not Deprived of All Beneficial Use
Because the Cordelia Lot Can Be Used in Other
Economic Ways.
A total taking under Lucas may only be found in “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial
use of land is permitted.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (emphasis in
original). Importantly, the Lucas Court went so far as to suggest
that not even a “95%” diminution in property value may suffice. Id.
at 1019 n.8. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
that “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property
of all value.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). Accordingly, jurisdictions have been generally unforgiving with the
application of the Lucas rule to property owners, rarely finding
that a total taking has occurred. Patricia E. Salkin, Total Takings
Cases and Principles, 2 Am. Law. Zoning § 16:7 (5th ed.).
The reality is that, in some cases, the landowner with a 95%
loss will get nothing, while the landowner with a total loss will recover in full. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. The Court is clear that
“takings law is full of these ‘all-or-nothing’ situations.” Id. For example, no total taking occurred where a company’s land lost 91%
of its value after its mining permit was revoked. Rith Energy, Inc.
v. U.S., 270 F.3d 1347, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In a New York
state case, the court held that certain wetlands regulations, which
decreased the value of the property by 95% and left a “bare residue”
of the property’s value, did not constitute a categorical taking under Lucas. Friedenburg v. New York State Dept. of Environmental
Conservation, 767 N.Y. S.2d 451, 460 (App. Div. 2003).
The Supreme Court also suggests that it is incorrect to assume
that “the only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution
are developmental uses.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8. Contrarily,
there are “a number of noneconomic interests in land. . . .” Id. For
example, the Seventh Circuit held that a city landmark ordinance
did not deprive a property owner of “all economically beneficial or
productive use of its property.” Int’l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 368 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court found that, even
with a landmark designation and denial of demolition permits, the
property owner could alternatively use the property as its office or
a museum. Id. at 368.
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Here, the Plaintiff asserts that her property has no value unless there is a house on the Cordelia Lot. However, the Butterfly
Society’s offer demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s land has current
value, even if it is not in the manner in which she hoped. Additionally, the Lot can be used for other aesthetic or recreational purposes. While there may be a decrease in property value, this alone
does not meet the total loss requirement of Lucas. Specifically, the
Plaintiff still maintains ownership of a piece of property that can
provide her income. Therefore, the current economic uses of the
Cordelia Lot prelude the Plaintiff’s total takings claim.
B. The Property Tax Does Not Negate the Lot’s
Current Economic Value Because It Is a Fixed
Cost of Property Ownership.
The amount of the property tax does not negate the current
economic value of the Cordelia Lot. The property tax is simply a
cost of owning the property; it is unavoidable. State courts, which
typically hear more takings cases than federal courts, have noted
that “[t]he takings clause . . . does not charge the government with
guaranteeing the profitability of every piece of land subject to its
authority.” Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.
1994). Further, the Texas Supreme Court explained that “[p]urchasing and developing real estate carries with it certain financial
risks, and it is not the government’s duty to underwrite this risk
as an extension of obligations under the takings clause.” Id.
This Court should apply the Taub holding to the Plaintiff’s
case, as it is not the responsibility of the FWS or Brittain County
to ensure the marketability or profitability of her land. With one
monetary offer for butterfly exhibits, it is possible that the Plaintiff
could obtain additional offers, further solidifying the monetary
value of her property. Frankly, without the offer, the Plaintiff
would still pay $1,500 per year in property tax, as she has been
doing for almost a decade. Thus, the Butterfly Society’s offer provides the Plaintiff with current economic value for the land, along
with its aesthetic and recreational uses. Therefore, a total takings
claim under Lucas is precluded.
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VI. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY
THE CORDELIA LOT, THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM
FAILS BECAUSE PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES
INHERENT IN TITLE PRECLUDE A TAKING.
Even if the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, public
trust principles inherent in title preclude the Plaintiff’s claim for a
taking based on the denial of a county wetlands permit. The District Court incorrectly held that no public trust reservation existed
in 1803, the Congressional grant was superior to a subsequent
“equal footing” claim by New Union, and that background principles of state property law did not preclude a takings claim against
the County. R. at 10. However, all of these findings were in error.
A. The Land Below Lake Union Is Part of the Public
Trust Because Lake Union is Navigable-in-Fact.
Under the public trust doctrine, navigable waterways are
“held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters.” Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 452 (1892). In the United States, the public trust doctrine
applies to navigable waters that are non-tidal as well as tidal. See
PPL Mont. LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1226-27 (2012).
In determining whether a waterway is navigable, and thus
whether the land below the water is subject to the public trust doctrine, courts employ the Supreme Court’s four-part “navigabilityin-fact” test. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 562
(1870). Under that test, waterways are navigable in fact if they are
used:
[1] in their ordinary condition, [2] as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted [3] in the customary modes of trade and travel on water . . . [4] when they form . . .
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on.4

Id.
Here, the Plaintiff’s property meets the requirements for the
navigability-in-fact test. First, Lake Union meets the “trade or
4. The Supreme Court later eliminated the “ordinary condition” requirement
in United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940).
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travel” prong as it has traditionally provided an interstate commercial waterway for the transportation of produce from the island
to the mainland. R. at 5. Additionally, the wetlands that the Plaintiff desires to fill were historically open water used as a boat landing for said commercial transport. Id. Second, the “customary
modes” prong has been interpreted to mean that a waterway must
be capable of navigation simply by a small boat or canoe, which
would certainly have been a mode of commercial transportation
when the island was granted in 1803, and for much of its history.
See, e.g., FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151,
1157 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Lake Union and the cove meet this prong
because the shallow cove of Lake Union has historically been used
for a boat landing. R. at 5. Moreover, the depth needed for navigability in 1803 was not great, as most boats were of much smaller
size than boats typically used for commerce today. Finally, the
“highway for commerce” prong is clearly met, as the cove of the
Cordelia Lot originates from and flows into the navigable, interstate waters of Lake Union. Id.
The Plaintiff further asserted that Lake Union, as a non-tidal
water, was not included in the public trust at the time of the 1803
grant. In determining that the Plaintiff’s claims to lands under water within 300 feet of the shoreline did not fall within public trust
limits in 1803, the District Court relied upon a collection of state
court cases cited in PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1227. However, the
District Court’s reliance upon the cases cited within PPL Montana
is inapposite.
First, while the state court cases cited in PPL Montana represent the dates at which those particular states adopted the public
trust doctrine for non-tidally-influenced waters, they do not
demonstrate that other states, including New Union, had not previously adopted the doctrine. In fact, the Court in PPL Montana
simply suggested that after the American Revolution in the 1770s,
states began changing their standards for the public trust away
from the tidal requirement. Id. at 1227. Further, the District Court
failed to consider the Supreme Court’s navigability-in-fact test,
which clearly demonstrates that the lands underwater within 300
feet of the shoreline would have been considered navigable at the
time of the Congressional grant, and thus limited by public trust
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principles. Since Lake Union is navigable-in-fact and non-tidal waters are included in the public trust, the land below Lake Union is
properly subject to the public trust. Id. at 1226.
B. The 1803 Congressional Grant of the Land Below
Lake Union to the Lear Family Is Void Under the
“Equal Footing” Doctrine Because Only the State
of New Union Had Authority to Grant the
Underlying Lands.
If the subject land is determined to be below a navigable waterway and thus part of the public trust, any conveyance of title by
Congress to the underlying soil became void upon the state’s accession to the union. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1892). In
Shively, the defendant brought suit to quiet title to lands below the
high-water mark on the Columbia River that he had acquired pursuant to a purchase from the State of Oregon. Id. at 2. The defendant claimed that the grant held by the plaintiff from the United
States passed no title or right as against a subsequent deed from
the state to the defendant. Id. The Plaintiff appealed the judgment
of the Oregon Supreme Court, which declared that the land belonged to the defendant. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision, holding that navigable waters and the soils beneath them
remain public highways. Id. at 58. Moreover, the Court affirmed
that once a state accedes to the union, all grants and laws applicable to the former territory become null and void, and all lands become property of the state, to be regulated and disposed of according to state law. Id.
In arriving at its holding, the Shively Court explained that:
[g]rants by Congress of portions of the public lands [below navigable waterways] within a Territory to settlers thereon, though
bounded by navigable waters, convey, of their own force, no title or
right below high water mark, and do not impair the title and dominion of the future State when created; but leave the question of
the use. . .to the sovereign control of each State.

Shively, 152 U.S. at 58. Thus, any title to the lands below Lake
Union that were conveyed to the Lears by the 1803 Congressional
grant became null and void upon the accession of New Union as a
state – regardless of when that occurred. In order for the Lears’
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title to be valid, they must demonstrate a right to the land conveyed to them by New Union. There is no evidence on the record
that the Lears ever received title from the state, and, therefore
they show no valid claim to the land beneath Lake Union.
C. Lucas Precludes Compensation for the Plaintiff’s
Claim Because Filling Public Trust Wetlands
Constitutes a Nuisance.
While the holding in Shively nullifies the Plaintiff’s claim of
title to lands below Lake Union, Lucas also holds that compensation is not required for development limits that “inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004. The Supreme Court has stated that “zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law,” as “[z]oning regulations existed as far back as colonial
Boston.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352. Additionally, environmental law scholars generally agree that wetland protection regulations qualify as longstanding features of state property law, as
English law sought to prevent the destruction of wetlands even before the colonies enacted zoning regulations. See, e.g., Michael C.
Blumm, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321,
358 (2005).
Collectively, the judicial system’s traditional emphasis on the
importance of wetlands to the environment and the Supreme
Court’s recognition of background principles of state property law
show that the County’s denial of a wetlands fill permit constitutes
a restriction already placed upon land ownership at the time of the
Congressional grant. See Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the destruction
of wetlands could produce an “environmental catastrophe” and
that wetlands are critical to flood control, water supply, water
quality, and wildlife). Accordingly, denials of dredge and fill permits are not subject to takings liability because such denials
simply prevent the equivalent of a nuisance. See Blumm at 337
(citing Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth
Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,”
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29 ENVTL. L. 939, 971). For this reason, Brittain County’s regulation denying the Plaintiff a fill permit is immune from any Lucas
takings claim.
VII. ASSUMING THE RELEVANT PARCEL IS ONLY
THE CORDELIA LOT, FWS AND BRITTAIN
COUNTY ARE NOT JOINTLY LIABLE BECAUSE
THE REGULATIONS ARE CLEARLY DIVISIBLE.
Even if the relevant parcel is only the Cordelia Lot, the ESA
and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law must be considered separately. The two regulations cover different portions of
the Lot and were enacted ten years apart. The ESA is the regulatory scheme that conflicts with the Plaintiff’s desire to build on the
Cordelia Lot. The Wetlands Preservation Law, however, does not
prohibit any construction on the Heath, which makes up 90% of
the Cordelia Lot. Accordingly, the County’s regulation does not deprive the Plaintiff of all economic value. Therefore, the FWS and
Brittain County should not be held jointly and severally liable.
A. The District Court Erred by Applying a Minority
Rule of Tort Law to the Cordelia Lot Because Most
Jurisdictions Apply Several or Modified Joint and
Several Liability.
In an attempt to answer a novel question of law, the District
Court chose to apply a doctrine of tort law to this taking claim.
However, the District Court erred by claiming that joint and several liability is the “prevailing” rule. Rather, the trend in the
United States has shown a move away from pure joint and several
liability. See Joint and Several Liability, 1 Comparative Negligence Manual §1:24 (3d ed.). Currently, only eight states apply
pure joint and several liability, where the plaintiff may collect any
portion of the judgment from either defendant. See American Tort
Reform Association, Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform.5
However, fourteen states apply pure several liability while twentyeight states apply modified joint and several liability. Id. Most

5. American Tort Reform Association, Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform, http://www.atra.org/issues/joint-and-several-liability-rule-reform (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
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states shy away from pure joint and several liability, as it often
creates unfair liabilities amongst the tortfeasors.
The District Court stretched tort liability, sua sponte, into
property and takings law. This Court, however, should not apply a
rule that is in fact the minority rule across the country. Specifically, the County regulation only restricts about one acre of wetlands within the entire ten-acre property. If the regulation were
actually a taking, it equates to only a 10% liability for the County.
In states applying a form of modified joint liability, which is the
predominant rule, it would be extremely unlikely for a court to require a party with 10% fault to pay 90% of the overall damages.
See, e.g., Narkeeta Timber Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 777 So.2d 39, 42
(Miss. 2000) (In a state applying modified joint liability, the court
held that a defendant who was 20% at fault could not be held liable
for more than 50% of the judgment).
B. The Alleged Damages Should Be Apportioned
Because the Regulations Are Divisible.
Even if this Court finds a total taking, the damages are easily
divisible and should be apportioned. The Restatement Second of
Torts § 433A provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution
of each cause to a single harm.

Id. The Restatement supports the idea of fair and equitable apportionment of fault when damages are clearly divisible.
In the present case, the county wetlands regulation was in
place ten years before the ESA’s regulation and does not restrict
the same portion of the property. Therefore, a reasonable basis for
determining the liability for each defendant is to allot the damages
based on the percentage of the Cordelia Lot that each law restricts.
See, e.g., Roebuck v. Duprey, 274 A.D.2d 620, 621 (N.Y. 2000) (In a
modified joint liability state, “while it is sometimes the case that
tortfeasors who neither act concurrently nor in concert may nevertheless be considered jointly and severally liable, this occurs [only]
in those instances where certain injuries are ‘incapable of any reasonable or practicable division or allocation among multiple tort-
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feasors.’”). Under this approach, the FWS would be liable for 90%,
while Brittain County would be liable for 10%.
The District Court played the role of the Plaintiff’s lawyer and
applied a minority rule of tort law to a property takings case, without regard to the fairness towards the Defendants. The fact that
the Plaintiff forfeited any damages over $10,000 against the FWS
is a procedural bar that she elected to place upon herself. This
Court should not punish the County for the Plaintiff’s decision to
forfeit possible damages. Accordingly, the ESA and the County
wetlands law should be considered separately, which precludes a
total takings claim. In the alternative, this Court should reverse
the $90,000 judgment against the County.

CONCLUSION
The ESA is an unconstitutional violation of Congressional
power under the Commerce Clause because the Karner Blue Butterfly does not substantially affect interstate commerce. In the alternative, the Plaintiff’s takings claim fails because it is not ripe,
as she failed to apply for an ITP. Additionally, the parcel as a whole
rule supports viewing Lear Island as the relevant parcel for the
takings analysis, and not the subdivided Cordelia Lot. If the Court
finds that the Cordelia Lot is the relevant parcel, a total taking has
not occurred because the lot retains future economic value. The
property also retains current economic value through the $1,000
annual payment from the Butterfly Society. Furthermore, public
trust principles inherent in title preclude a taking against the
County. Finally, the ESA and County Wetlands regulations are
clearly divisible, and any alleged damages should be apportioned.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the order of the District Court,
and find in favor of the positions asserted by Brittain County.
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